The Legacy of Continental Airlines v. American Airlines: A Re-Evaluation of Predatory Pricing Theory in the Airline Industry by Clouatre, Mark T.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 60 | Issue 3 Article 4
1995
The Legacy of Continental Airlines v. American
Airlines: A Re-Evaluation of Predatory Pricing
Theory in the Airline Industry
Mark T. Clouatre
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark T. Clouatre, The Legacy of Continental Airlines v. American Airlines: A Re-Evaluation of Predatory Pricing Theory in the Airline
Industry, 60 J. Air L. & Com. 869 (1995)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol60/iss3/4
THE LEGACY OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES V.
AMERICAN AIRLINES: A RE-EVALUATION OF




I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 870
II. DEFINITION & EXPLANATION OF
PREDATORY PRICING .......................... 872
A. PREDATORY PRICING DEFINED .................. 872
B. CODIFICATION OF PREDATORY PRICING-15
U .S.C . § 2 .................................... 872
C. ELEMENTS OF A PREDATORY PRICING CLAIM
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT ...... 874
D. COST STANDARDS USED BY THE COURTS ....... 876
E. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE EXISTENCE
OF PREDATORY PRICING ........................ 883
F. HISTORY OF PREDATORY PRICING SUITS IN THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY SINCE 1978 ................. 887
III. ANALYSIS OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
V AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC ................... 890
A. OVERVIEW ..................................... 890
B. THE COURT HELD IN FAVOR OF AMERICAN
AIRLINES ...................................... 894
IV. EFFECTS OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. V.
AMERICAN AIRLINES INC ....................... 895
A. NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON PARTIES TO A
PREDATORY PRICING SUIT ..................... 895
B. EFFECTS ON MAJOR AIRLINES .................. 896
C. EFFECTS ON SMALLER AIRLINES ................ 899
869
870 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
D. EFFECTS ON CONSUMERS ...................... 901
V. ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS TO THE
PRESENT SITUATION ........................... 903
A. INTRODUCTION ................................ 903
B. MAINTAIN CURRENT DEREGULATED STATUS OF
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY ........................ 904
C. INCREASE REGULATION OF AIRLINE PRICING
A CTIONS ...................................... 906
D. ELIMINATE THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
PREDATORY PRICING ALTOGETHER ............. 907
E. REQUIRE COMPETITIVELY RESPONSIVE FARES TO
REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF
T IM E .......................................... 908
F. REGULATE AIRLINES' PUBLISHING OF RATES .... 909
G. PERMIT CONSUMERS TO BRING PREDATORY
PRICING SUITS ................................ 911
VI. CONCLUSION ................................... 912
I. INTRODUCTION
"A PREDATORY PRICING conspiracy is by nature spec-
"Aulative."1 The foregoing statement by Justice Powell
seems to embody the current hesitancy and reluctance of
legal commentators and courts to recognize the existence
of predatory pricing in the contemporary marketplace. 2
But the need to reexamine the judicial rules addressing
predatory pricing is of particular import with respect to the
airline industry after the outcome of the recent case pitting
Continental and NorthWest Airlines against American Air-
lines.3 In this case, the plaintiffs, Continental and North-
West Airlines, accused their competitor, American Airlines,
of pricing its fares below cost to drive competitors out of
business. After less than three hours of deliberation, the
jury followed the view expressed by Justice Powell and other
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
2 Id. at 589.
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex.
1993).
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contemporary commentators about predatory pricing suits
and dismissed the charges against American.4
Unfortunately, the parties' expenditures were not limited
to the three hours of jury deliberations. They spent enor-
mous amounts of time and money on the suit. American,
for example, spent more than twenty million dollars on
legal costs alone.5 In a struggling industry such as the air-
line industry, these legal costs are not only burdensome,
but may well be crippling.6 And to what effect? In the ab-
sence of egregious conduct on the part of the defendant,
predatory pricing claims have little chance of success under
current law.7
In light of these considerations, one may query why a
cause of action exists for predatory pricing. Using the out-
come of the Continental/American suit as a benchmark,
predatory pricing suits appear only to impose great burdens
on the parties involved, rather than reaching to a result that
is more responsive to the claims.
To explore such questions, this comment will first ex-
amine the applicable law and standards used by the courts
in adjudicating predatory pricing claims. The comment
will then focus on an analysis of the recent Continental/
American suit. Next, the comment will analyze the effects
of current predatory pricing law on large and small airlines
and consumers. Finally, the comment will present alterna-
tive methods to approaching the problem of predatory pric-
ing in the airline industry.
4 James T. McKenna, American Cleared of Unfair Pricing AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 16, 1993, at 34.
- Predatory Pricing Idea Unrealistic, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, Aug. 12, 1993, at 5C.
6 As an example of the beleaguered state of the airline industry, American Air-
lines lost $1.4 billion between October 1990 and March 1993. Martin Zimmerman
& Terry Maxon, Verdict Clears Way for Resumption of Air Fare Wars, DALLAs MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 11, 1993, at 1D.
I See, e.g., Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574; ContinentalAirlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 689.
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II. DEFINITION & EXPLANATION OF
PREDATORY PRICING
A. PREDATORY PRICING DEFINED
Predatory pricing theoretically occurs when the predator
sets its prices below costs in an attempt to drive competitors
out of business or to deter potential competitors from en-
tering the market.8 After the predator has successfully mo-
nopolized the market, the predator raises prices to high
levels to recoup its losses and reap monopoly profits.9
In so doing, the predator and the victim "incur losses
during the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a
rational calculation for the predator to view the losses as an
investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals are to
be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where rivals are
to be disciplined)."'1° In either case, the predator is willing
to forgo immediate profits in hopes of obtaining greater
future rewards."
B. CODIFICATION OF PREDATORY PRICING-15 U.S.C § 2
In the Sherman Act of 1890, Congress statutorily pro-
tected the public against the threat of predatory pricing.12
Specifically, Congress prohibits predatory pricing in 15
U.S.C. § 2, which provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not ex-
s Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.8.
9 PREDATORY PRICING 9 (Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development
ed., 1989).
10 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 145
(1978).
11 Id.
12 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. 1 1994).
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ceeding three years, or by both said punishments in the dis-
cretion of the court.1
3
By enacting this legislation, Congress tried to achieve sev-
eral objectives. First, Congress attempted to discourage
smaller businesses from forming monopolies. 4 In other
words, Congress attempted "to protect trade and commerce
against unlawful restraints and monopolies."15 Second,
Congress enacted the Sherman Act to ensure that consum-
ers would reap the benefits of price competition by protect-
ing their economic freedom.' 6 Third, Congress tried to
distinguish the fine line between healthy competition and
predatory behavior. 7 The Supreme Court noted that
"[t] he law directs itself not against conduct which is com-
petitive, even severely so, but against conduct which un-
fairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out
of solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the
public interest."' With this policy in mind, Congress not
only attempted to protect the individual consumer through
regulation, but also to further the consumer's interest by
attempting to draw a line between pure competition and
predation. 9 Historically, this line between competition
and predation has troubled both courts and commentators
when they discuss the theory of predatory pricing.20
is Id.
14 LAURENCE E. GESELL, AVIATION AND THE LAw IX-34 (1986). Congress feared
that two or more firms might merge or consolidate their interests in an effort to
obtain greater market share through monopolization. Id.
15 Id.
16 Brian Clewer, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 674 F. Supp. 782, 786 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims that defendant air-
lines priced their tickets to drive a competitor affiliated with plaintiff out of
business).
17 See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
W Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993) (reversing lower
courts' decisions for plaintiff in predatory pricing suit brought under the Sherman
Act by former distributors against manufacturer and other distributors).
19 See American Airlines' Motion for, and Memorandum of Law in Support of,
Summary Adjudication at 23, Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (No. G-92-CV-266) [hereinafter American's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgement].
20 Id.
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C. ELEMENTS OF A PREDATORY PRICING CLAIM UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Because the Sherman Act provides no clear rules de-
lineating the distinction between competitive and preda-
tory behavior, courts have developed and applied their own
standard. 21 First, the plaintiff must prove that the defend-
ant engaged in predatory or anticompetitive behavior.22
Courts will look for the plaintiff to prove that the defend-
ant's conduct had no reasonable business justification and
that the conduct was more predatory than competitive. 3
When deciding whether the plaintiff has engaged in preda-
tory conduct, the court may examine several factors, includ-
ing whether competitors would consider the behavior to be
economically rational; whether the behavior increases prod-
uct efficiency; whether any existing industry conditions
such as high entry barriers may augment the predatory re-
sults of the behavior; whether the defendant can increase
its market share through predatory behavior; and. whether
an increase in market share will help to recoup the defend-
ant's investment in predation. 4 If the court decides that
the defendant acted in a predatory manner after examining
21 See generally Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). Justice Holmes
developed the elements of an attempted monopolization cause of action in this
landmark case. Specifically, the plaintiff must show: 1) specific intent to control
prices or eliminate competition in some market; 2) predatory or anticompetitive
conduct directed at accomplishing this unlawful purpose; and 3) a dangerous
probability that the conduct, if permitted to run its course, would have created a
monopoly. Id. Although the courts' recitation of these three basic elements has not
wavered since 1905, individual courts often disagree over the proper interpretation
of these elements. See In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Li-
tig., 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
22 Spectrum Sports, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 890.
23 PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 9, at 44. Under this first element, a distinction
must be made between actions illegal under state law, such as misrepresentation and
false advertising, and attempts to monopolize. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRUST 120
(1993). Illegal actions under state law are not predatory in nature unless the actor is
capable of attaining monopoly power through the use of such action. The distinc-
tion is important because violations under state law entitle the claimant to only sin-
gle damages. Id. On the other hand, a successful claimant under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act is entitled to treble damages plus attorney's fees. Id.
24 PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 9, at 45.
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some or all of these factors, the court proceeds to the next
element.
If the court finds the defendant's conduct to be preda-
tory, it then requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the de-
fendant's "specific intent to monopolize."25 Because it is
difficult to obtain direct evidence of the defendant's intent
to destroy competition, courts usually focus on the defend-
ant's conduct as indirect evidence of predatory intent.
2 6
Consequently, the defendant's intent is often inferred from
its conduct, especially when the conduct appears to have a
predatory, rather than a business, justification. 27 Addition-
ally, courts review subjective evidence of the defendant's in-
tent as well as other objective market factors.28
Finally, to prove a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, the plaintiff must show that the defendant possessed "a
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power. "29
Courts typically examine the defendant's market share
when determining whether a dangerous probability of mo-
nopolization exists. Courts generally consider a market
share of less than forty to sixty percent inadequate to estab-
25 Spectrum Sports, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 890. Although a business in its regular course
prefers to hurt or beat its competitors, courts require evidence of intent in order to
analyze the underlying reasons and potential effects of the activity. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 23, at 118.
- PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 9, at 44. Courts require this indirect evidence to
show the defendant's intent to achieve monopoly power, not simply to show the
defendant's intent to exclude competition. For example, the Ninth Circuit stated
that the "mere intention ... to exclude competition... is insufficient to establish
specific intent to monopolize by some illegal means .... To conclude otherwise
would contravene the very essence of a competitive marketplace, which is to prevail
against all competitors." William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITr Continental Bak-
ing, 668 P.2d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S. 825 (1982).
27 PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 9, at 44. Robert Bork stated that "[a] ntitrust law
has never clearly defined what it means by predation, but the concept clearly con-
tains an element of wrongful or specific intent...." Boitx, supra note 10, at 144. He
then warned that a more specific method of analysis is needed because inaccurate
proof of intent may lead to labeling legal, competitive behavior as predatory. Id.
- See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
Spectrum Sports, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 890-91. The main policy behind the "danger-
ous probability" element is that courts wish to distinguish between ambiguous ac-
tions which may or may not be anticompetitive. HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 119-
20. Courts are more apt to characterize ambiguous conduct as predatory in markets
conducive to monopolization. Id. at 120.
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lish this probability.30 In addition to looking at the defend-
ant's market share, courts consider other factors, including
the market share of competitors; the financial stability and
well-being of competitors; the existing barriers to entry;
and the competitive history of the industry." If the court
determines that a dangerous probability existed after con-
sidering all or some of these factors, the court may find that
the defendant engaged in predatory conduct.3 2
- D. COST STANDARDS USED BY THE COURTS
To prove these three elements under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act,33 a plaintiff must also illustrate that the de-
fendant priced below some appropriate measure of cost
and that the defendant had reasonable opportunity to
recoup its losses from that pricing strategy.34 Although
commentators and courts agree that the plaintiff must
prove both of these cost elements in addition to the three
Sherman Act requirements, neither commentators nor
courts agree upon the appropriate measure of cost or de-
gree of recoupment.35
To understand fully the measure of cost that courts use to
judge claims, it is necessary to analyze the different types of
costs that a business entity might incur. First, variable costs
are costs that fluctuate, depending on the firm's level of
output.36 Examples of variable costs include utilities, raw
'o PREDATORY PRICING, supra note 9, at 46.
Id. A majority of courts will not find the dangerous probability element ful-
filled if the defendant does not have a large market share. HOVENKAMP, supra note
23, at 120.
32 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596.
" In review, the plaintiff must show: 1) the defendant's conduct possessed no
reasonable business justification; 2) the defendant had specific intent to monopo-
lize; and 3) the defendant possessed a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly
power. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
34 Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2581
(1993) (affirming district court judge's grant ofjudgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict in favor of cigarette manufacturer accused of predatory pricing by competitor).
- See infra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
36 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 698.
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materials, and wages.3 From variable costs, courts calculate
average variable cost by dividing the sum of all variable
costs by the number of units produced. 8
The second type of costs are fixed costs. Fixed costs re-
main the same regardless of the output level.3 9 Courts cal-
culate the total cost for a firm by adding all variable and
fixed costs. 40 Another type of cost important to predatory
pricing analysis is the firm's marginal cost. Marginal cost is
the cost to produce one extra unit of output, given a partic-
ular level of production." When pricing at their marginal
cost, firms achieve maximum efficiency. 42
One influential law review article on predatory pricing
declared that "the relevant cost is marginal cost."43 Areeda
and Turner made this assertion based on one main assump-
tion: since marginal cost pricing represents maximum effi-
ciency, it serves as an ideal standard for judging whether or
not the firm's pricing policies were predatory or competi-
tive in nature.44 They contended that if a firm priced its
good or service at marginal cost, it was acting in an econom-
ically rational manner and was not, therefore, engaging in
57 Id. For example, if a car manufacturer experiences a surge in car orders, it may
have to hire additional workers, consume more electricity to accommodate the in-
creased rate of production, and use more steel as more cars are being manufactured
due to the increased demand. In this hypothetical case, the wages, utilities, and raw
materials would be considered variable costs as they are costs that vary with output.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 122.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 122.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 698 n.14. Examples of fixed costs are
interest payments on debt and depreciation through obsolescence. See Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 408 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted in part, 488 U.S. 980 (1988), affd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
40 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 698.
41 Id.
42 HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 121. Firms price at marginal cost because if a
firm sells below its marginal cost, it will lose money on the sale since the revenue
received will be less than the cost of producing and selling the additional unit. Id.
43 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HA.v. L. REv. 697, 702 (1975). Since the publication
of the Areeda-Turner article in 1975, every circuit court addressing a predatory pric-
ing claim has adopted some variation of the Areeda-Turner formula. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 23, at 121.
- Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 701-02.
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predatory pricing.45 Areeda and Turner explained that
firms, in deciding whether to increase or decrease output,
often consider the incremental effects on revenues and
costs. 46 Since marginal costs depend on the incremental ef-
fects on revenues and costs, the authors concluded that
marginal cost was the appropriate measure of cost with
which to judge claims of predatory pricing.47 Therefore,
the authors advocated "a prohibition of prices below margi-
nal cost."48
Areeda and Turner acknowledged, however, several
problems with this theory. The main problem was the diffi-
culty in calculating a firm's marginal cost.49 The authors
explained, "[t] he incremental cost of making and selling
the last unit cannot readily be inferred from conventional
business accounts, which typically go no further than show-
ing observed average variable cost."50 Because of the diffi-
culty in ascertaining marginal cost, another measurement
of cost must be used as a surrogate for marginal cost.5'
For this alternative measurement of cost, Areeda and
Turner selected average variable cost 52  because account-
ants can more easily ascertain its value. 3 Thus, average va-
45 Id. By pricing at marginal cost, firms are pricing at the exact cost to produce an
additional unit.
46 Id. at 702-03.
47 Id. at 712.
48 Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 716. Areeda and Turner suggested this
standard because pricing above or below marginal cost would not be economically
rational as the firm would not be opting for maximum efficiency. Id. at 712. Rather,
pricing above or below marginal cost would simply be loss or profit-maximizing. Id.
at 717. Although it appears that any firm that could sell above its marginal cost
would do so, Areeda and Turner theorized that firms would choose the most ra-
tional option. Id.
49 Id. at 716.
N" Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 716.
51 Id.
52 Id.
5 Id. For average variable cost, firms only need to add all of the variable costs and
divide by total output. The individual variable costs are much more easily identifi-
able than the somewhat theoretical marginal cost, the cost to produce an additional
unit of output. Although average variable cost is easier to determine than marginal
cost, some courts still have difficulty with its calculation, especially in the differentia-
tion between fixed and variable cost. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 825
878
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riable cost is more valid in an evidentiary context than the
theoretical marginal cost. The authors also likened an aver-
age variable cost rule to that of marginal cost because it al-
lows for a certain amount of flexibility. 54 As a result, this
freedom allows the defendant more room to prove that its
price was equal to or above its average variable cost. For
example, an average variable cost standard allows the de-
fendant the flexibility to show expected lower costs in the
future and why it lowered its prices to account for such ex-
pected decreases.55
Some courts, however, have disagreed with the reasoning
of Areeda and Turner.56 The court in Continental Airlines,
Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. stated that "[marginal cost] in-
cludes only increments of additional cost, while [average va-
riable cost] includes all variable costs for all units of
output."5 7 Because of the differences between the two types
of costs, marginal cost was not an ideal substitute for aver-
age variable cost.58 Nevertheless, the court qualified its
prior statements by saying that in certain circumstances, av-
erage variable cost may serve as a substitute for marginal
CoSt.
59
In addition to courts, commentators expressed concern
with Areeda and Turner's average variable cost standard. 60
(1982). The Ninth Circuit refrained from using a "laundry list" prepared by Areeda
and Turner to differentiate between fixed and variable costs. Instead, the court de-
cided that the determination of whether a particular cost is fixed or variable must be
made on a case-by-case basis. Id.
- Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 716.
55 Id. at 716-17.
5 SeeJanich Bros. v. Amer. Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 829 (1978) (modifying the Areeda-Turner test); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.,
541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1974 (1977) (departing from use
of Areeda-Turner test); In re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694
F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has modified the
Areeda-Turner test).
-7 824 F. Supp. at 698.
5 1d.
-9 Id. The court seemed to say that average variable cost may serve as a substitute
for marginal cost when it is impossible to determine marginal cost from an exami-
nation of the firm's records. Id.
- RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 191-93 (1976).
F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and The Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869
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For example, former director of the Bureau of Economics
for the Federal Trade Commission F.M. Scherer argued
that even if a firm sets its price below its average total cost, it
may still be predatory even though its price is above its aver-
age variable cost.61 Thus, some commentators believe that
Areeda and Turner's average variable cost standard may
not cover all forms of predatory pricing.
In spite of the concern over Areeda and Turner's article,
most courts have accepted the average variable cost stan-
dard.6" Courts generally use the following standard in de-
termining whether a particular price is predatory:
1. Prices above average total cost are legal per se.
2. At prices above average variable cost the plaintiff must
overcome a strong presumption of legality by showing other
factors indicating that the price charged is anticompetitive.
3. At prices below average variable cost, the burden of
showing non-predation falls on the defendant.63
In addition to considering this cost based standard,
courts also examine other factors that may affect competi-
(1976); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatoy Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284 (1977); Douglas F. Greer, A Critique of Areeda & Turner's Standard for
Predatory Practices, 24 ANTITRUST BuLL. 233 (1979).
61 See Scherer, supra note 60. Areeda and Turner acknowledged but dismissed
this fact in their article. Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 704. As an example,
they stated that when firms price below total cost but above average variable cost,
"[u]nless acting irrationally or out of ignorance, the firm is likely to be charging the
lower price in order to preserve or enhance its market share by deterring rivals."
Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 704. While this pricing behavior may not seem
predatory on its face, Areeda and Turner admitted that such behavior should be
presumed to be non-predatory only when the prices equal or exceed average total
cost. Id.
62 See, e.g., Chillicothe Sand & Gravel v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th
Cir. 1980); AT&T v. FCC, 602 F.2d 401, 410 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pacific Eng'g &
Prod. Co. of Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977), rehg denied, 434 U.S. 977 (1977); International Air In-
dus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 521 F.2d
815 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); see also WILLIAM C. HOLMES,
ANTrrRusT LAW HANDBOOK 380-83 (1993) (stating that while a strict version of the
formula had been "uniformly rejected," most courts adopted a variation of the
formula).
6 International Travel Arrangers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389, 1394
(8th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court decision in favor of plaintiff, an independ-
ent tour operator, who sued an airline and its affiliated air carrier and tour operator
for predatory pricing).
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tion within the industry. For example, courts may weigh
entry barriers within an industry.' If barriers within an in-
dustry are low, new competitors may freely enter the market
in spite of the predator's pricing scheme. 65 When the
predator increases its prices, new entrants will flood the
market and drive the predator's price back to a competitive
level. As a result, if barriers are low, courts presume that no
predatory pricing exists, as the predator would be acting
irrationally.66
Courts may also examine competitors' abilities to match
or counteract the predator's below-cost pricing scheme
with similar or greater price decreases of their own.6 7 If
competitors can match the predator's prices either through
a similar price reduction or decrease in production, the
predator would again be acting irrationally as its prices
would have no effect, other than incurring unnecessary
losses.' Courts may therefore presume that no predatory
pricing exists because such behavior by the predator would
not be economically rational.69
In addition, courts may look to subjective evidence of the
defendant's intent, as well as to objective market factors,
when the defendant's prices fall between its average varia-
ble cost and its average total cost.70 In looking at these cost
and objective standards, courts are trying to differentiate
64 HOLMES, supra note 62, at 382. A barrier to entry is an industry factor that
allows already established firms the opportunity to operate at costs that are less ex-
pensive than those of a new entrant. HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 125.
6 See HOLMES, supra note 62, at 382.
- See American Academic Suppliers v. Beckley-Cardy, 922 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding that a firm can only engage in predatory pricing in markets with
high entry barriers).
67 Id. at 1321.
6 Id.
69 Id.
70 McGahee v. North Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988); see
also HOLMES, supra note 62, at 383. Holmes commented that courts do not rely on
subjective evidence alone to prove predatory pricing but instead require the subjec-
tive evidence to be supported by objective market evidence. HOLMES, supra note 62,
at 383.
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between aggressive, procompetitive behavior and predatory
pricing.71
While courts and commentators generally agree that
Areeda and Turner's average cost standard should be fol-
lowed, victims of alleged predatory pricing schemes find
that meeting this standard is very difficult. 72 As a spokes-
person for an unsuccessful plaintiff in a predatory pricing
suit commented, "[t]oday's outcome only demonstrates
how hard it is for the underlying facts to percolate through
the sometime monotonous but requisite testimony about
economic theory and pricing analysis." 73 Almost all plain-
tiffs have difficulty in overcoming the view that aggressive
behavior is often simply competitive and not predatory.74
Courts sometimes acknowledge the alleged victims' criti-
cisms about the high standard of proof required in preda-
tory pricing suits. 75 For example, the Supreme Court in
Brook Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco stated that
"[t]hese prerequisites to recovery are not easy to establish,
but they are not artificial obstacles to recovery; rather, they
are essential components of real market injury. "76 While
courts have recognized that such a high standard serves as a
bar to many potentially valid actions, many have com-
mented that the standard is necessary as "[i] t would be
ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability
were so low that antitrust suits themselves became a tool for
keeping prices high."77 Thus, courts have acknowledged
the difficulty in meeting such a standard while they also
have recognized that such a standard is required to differ-
entiate between pure competition and predatory pricing.7
71 HOLMES, supra note 62, at 383-84.
72 See, e.g., Isae Wada, AAL Verdict Lifts Cloud Over Pricing Tactics, TRAWL WKLv.,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 1.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., Brook Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2589
(1993); see also Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890-91 (1993).
76 Brook Group, 113. S. Ct. at 2589.
7 Id. at 2590.
78 Id.
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Because of the high standard involved, courts have rarely
found evidence sufficieht to hold the defendant liable for
predatory pricing. 9 In fact, the Supreme Court has stated
that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful."80 In the eyes of the court, preda-
tion rarely occurs, if at all."1 A study of court decisions on
predatory pricing confirmed the suspicion that courts
rarely find predatory pricing to exist.8 2 Due to the relative
infrequency in which courts find predatory pricing, ques-
tions arise as to the rationale for bringing a cause of action
for predatory pricing.8
E. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF
PREDATORY PRICING
Questions regarding the existence of predatory pricing
stem from both the high standard and the low frequency of
finding its existence.84 After all, it may be irrational for
firms to expose themselves to the risks inherent in a preda-
tory pricing scheme. 5 These inherent costs and risks give
See Roger Parloff, Fare's Fair: Why the Predatory Pricing Case Against American Air-
lines Got To Trial-And No Further, Am. LAw., Oct. 1993, at 61. American Airlines'
attorney, Finis Cowan, said in his opening statement to the jury that "[n]o one,
unless it's Dr. Strangelove... could believe he could monopolize the airline indus-
try." Id.
8o Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
263, 313 (1981).
82 See generally Roland H. Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing. An Empirical Study, 4
ANTrrusT L. & ECON. REv. 105 (1971). In this study, the author probed alleged
predatory pricing examples during the past 100 years. He classified predatory pric-
ing as an instance in which: 1) the alleged predator priced below cost; 2) it pos-
sessed predatory intent; and 3) it succeeded in defeating the competitor. Id. at 111.
Although Dr. Koller found 95 convictions of predatory pricing, he stated that only
26 of the cases involved a record sufficient to meet his three elements. He then
analyzed these 26 cases in light of two facts: whether the predator profited from the
aggressive behavior; and whether the market was more inefficient and imperfect
after the predator priced below cost. Id. at 111-12. After this second round of analy-
sis, Dr. Koller found only five cases of pure predatory pricing. Thus, he concluded
that predatory pricing happened infrequently, if at all, as only five cases had arisen
over the past 100 years. Id. at 112.
83 See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
- See, e.g., MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Cudahy, J.); BomK, supra note 10, at 145; POSNER, supra note 60, at 184-96.
- See, e.g., BoRiC, supra note 10, at 145.
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rise to several arguments supporting the theory that preda-
tory pricing does not exist in the modern marketplace.
First, questionable behavior may not be predatory at all,
but rather pure competition. 6 Professor John S. McGee,
for example, doubted that predatory pricing ever existed. 7
By labeling some competitive behavior as predatory, a pred-
atory pricing claim may cause more harm than good, espe-
cially to the competitive process.8 8 Construing competitive
behavior as predatory conflicts with the purpose of the
Sherman Act, which is to protect competition, not impede
it.89 The Supreme Court stated that "cutting prices in order
to increase business often is the very essence of competi-
tion. Thus, mistaken inferences ...are especially costly
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect."9" The difficulty with predatory pric-
ing theory is differentiating between competition and pred-
atory pricing. 1 In accord with its statement in Matsushita,9 2
the Supreme Court recently stated that its reluctance to rec-
ognize a cause of action for predatory pricing stemmed
from the chance that such suits would "dampen the com-
petitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur."9 3 Such a
view, coupled with the lack of enforcement of predatory
pricing provisions, demonstrates that both commentators
and courts question the existence of a true predatory pric-
ing claim.94
In addition to the potential for injuring competition,
predatory pricing claims also seem irrational because effi-
cient firms will not want to subject themselves to such liabil-
ity.95 In creating a pricing scheme, why would a rational
86 Id.
87 SeeJohn S. McGee, Predatory Pric'ngRevisited, 23J.L. & ECON. 289, 300 (1980).
' Id.
8' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); Brian Clewer, Inc. v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 782, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
- Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.
91 BoRK, supra note 10, at 145.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.
93 Spectrum Sports, Inc., v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890 (1993).
- Id.
0 BoRiK, supra note 10, at 146-47.
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firm want to incur the great costs inherent in a predatory
pricing scheme that have only a marginal chance of being
recouped?96 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook answered this
question by finding it quite unlikely that a firm would
choose the more risky return of predatory pricing over
more stable alternatives.97 In order to recoup their costs
from predatory pricing, firms must gain enough market
share to cover their debts. To do so, predators must at least
neutralize, if not eliminate, their competitors.9 8 Judge Eas-
terbrook concluded that the predation-recoupment theory
did not make economic sense.99 As a result, the existence
of predatory pricing is also questionable because of the un-
likelihood that a predator will recoup its losses.100
Predatory pricing theory is also questioned because even
if the predator can recoup its costs, it must also consider
the time value of money in making its decision whether or
not to price its product or service in a predatory manner."0
Specifically, the predator must compare the value of the
money it loses while engaged in predatory pricing with the
present value of the money recouped in the long run.10 2
To be economically rational, the future profits, appropri-
ately discounted, must exceed the present size of the
losses. 103 In other words, the predator will need to recoup
more than it originally lost. Because of the difficulty in re-
couping even its initial losses, the predator may not recoup
the value lost from the interest on those losses.10 4
Finally, predatory pricing theory is questioned because of
the difficulty firms experience in maintaining monopoly
96 Id.
97 Easterbrook, supra note 81, at 275. Easterbrook stated that a profitable return
may only be available in certain infrequent events such as "no stockpiling, no long-
term contracts, certain death for the inefficient victim, [or] no new entry for 10
years." Id The author calls the chance of experiencing such events as "implausible"
at best. Id.
98 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589.
- Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1984).
100 Id.
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power over a long period of time." 5 To be successful, a
predatory pricing scheme must exclude or neutralize a
competitor for a period of time that is long enough for the
predator to recoup its losses as well as reap some additional
gain sufficient to cover lost interest.10 6 A predator's incen-
tive may be lessened because monopoly pricing may en-
courage eager new competitors to enter a market that
appears to be full of excess profits.1 0 7 As a result, predatory
pricing is debated on the somewhat irrational belief that
monopoly power can be sustained for a sufficient amount
of time.1 0 8
Although the existence of predatory pricing is sometimes
questioned, valid claims may exist and should not be pre-
cluded from legal attention. 10 9 After the verdict in their
case against American Airlines, Richard Hirst, NorthWest's
senior vice president and general counsel, said that
"[g] iven the same circumstances, we would pursue the same
course today."110 This statement illustrates that some peo-
ple believe that predatory pricing may exist and that the
behavior in question is monopolistic predation, not healthy
competition.1 Even though all claims may not prove to be
valid, some verifiable instances of predatory pricing may ex-
105 See Bopm, supra note 10, at 145.
1w Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589.
107 See Bore, supra note 10, at 145.
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Thinking About Predation-A Personal Diary, 6 RFv. IN-
DUS. ORG. 137 (1991); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REv.
1059 (1987); Richard D. Cudahy, The Coming Demise of Deregulation, 10 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 5-6 (1993).
110 McKenna, supra note 4, at 34. In addition, Hirst stated that he was still con-
vinced that American had engaged in predatory pricing in spite of the unfavorable
jury verdict. Id.
I51 See Cudahy, supra note 109, at 11. Judge Cudahy stated that in the past he was
willing to accept aggressive behavior as non-predatory in order to promote eco-
nomic efficiency and fairness. Id. Now, he has re-evaluated his commitment to eco-
nomic efficiency and increasingly recognizes anticompetitive behavior to be more
pervasive than before due to the discriminatory effects of predatory behavior. Id.
But see Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (depicting eco-
nomic competition as a "bruising rivalry" that does not have to include ideas of
fairness).
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ist and these instances should not be denied
adjudication.1 12
Additionally, to support the contention that predatory
pricing exists, voluminous materials have been written on
the subject, which may lend additional credit to its impor-
tance and credibility.'1 3 So much material has been written
that it is hard to dispute the concern over this topic. If
predatory pricing does not exist, then why are so many
commentators writing on the subject? In addition, the the-
ory that predatory pricing exists seems to be bolstered by
many skeptics who question its existence, and who at the
same time also acknowledge its potential. 4 For example,
Judge Robert Bork stated that predatory pricing allegations
are "foolish" and that they rest "upon the often-exploded
recoupment fallacy." 15 Later, however, Bork admitted that
predatory pricing was not inherently impossible and that
the "issue is the probability of the occurrence of predation
and the means available for detecting it."" 6 Thus, Bork,
who frequently questions the existence of true predatory
pricing, nevertheless commented that the issue does not
concern its existence, but its frequency of occurrence and
difficulty of verification.' 7 As a result, questions concern-
ing the existence of predatory pricing seem to be misguided.
Rather, questions regarding predatory pricing theory
should concern its frequency in the contemporary
marketplace.
F. HISTORY OF PREDATORY PRICING SUITS IN THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY SINCE 1978
Since deregulation in 1978, primary antitrust enforce-
ment authority has been in the hands of both the Civil Aer-
onautics Board (CAB) and the Department of
112 Cudahy, supra note 109, at 11.
113 See Easterbrook, supra note 81, at 263 n.1. This particular note points to more
than 15 sources discussing the topic of predatory pricing. Id.
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Transportation. Throughout these years, the CAB and the
Department of Transportation have been lax in enforcing
antitrust violations."1 8 Moreover, they have placed greater
emphasis on competition rather than predation.'19
Prior to January 1, 1985, the CAB acted as the primary
antitrust regulatory body for the airline industry. 120 From
1978 to 1985, the CAB was predisposed to find against
claims of predation. 121 With this predisposition in mind,
the CAB investigated alleged claims of predatory pricing
only if the alleged behavior met the following four
characteristics:
1. Did the competition set fares below marginal cost in any
city-pair at any time?
2. If so, did the competition persist in losing money after
the fares had been shown to be unprofitable?
3. Could the competition reasonably have hoped to attain
and maintain a position of monopoly power?
4. Did the competition accompany its fare reductions with
increased flight schedules in order to gain market share? 122
If the CAB decided that the behavior met this set of criteria,
only then would it begin investigating the claim.' 23 More
times than not, investigation did not guarantee
enforcement. 124
After the CAB initiated an investigation, it would enforce
sanctions only if the predator and its behavior met another
four-part test.125 This test placed great emphasis on the ef-
fects of the predation on competitors, the harm to consum-
ers by the predation, and the effect on consumers and
1 W. John Moore, Antitrust Comeback, 25 NAT'LJ. 2666 (1993).
I" Id. at 2667. Robert Pitofsky, an antitrust expert with the law firm of Arnold &
Porter in Washington, said that antitrust law "was sluggish if not dead" during the
1980's, probably due to this lax enforcement. Id.
120 PATRICIA M. BARLow, AVIATION ANTITRUST: THE EXTRATERRiTORiAL APPLICA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTA-
TION 34 (1988).
12 Robert G. Berger & StephanieJ. Mitchell, Predatoty Pricing in the Airline Industry:
A Case Study-The Policies and Practices of the CAB, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 287, 294 (1984).
"2 Id. at 295.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 297.
125 Id. at 296.
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competitors if the CAB suspended the predatory prac-
tice. 2' If the CAB found that the predation was not too
harmful to competitors and consumers and that it was com-
petitive in nature, the Board was reluctant to sanction the
predator even if it behaved with more aggression than rea-
sonable competition required.'27
Because of the CAB's predisposition against finding pred-
atory pricing, complainants found it difficult to make out a
case of predation strong enough to warrant investigation.1 28
In fact, the CAB's predisposition was so controlling that
only once did it investigate, much less enforce, sanctions
against a predator.1 29  In short, the CAB was lenient on
predatory pricing claims and placed much greater empha-
sis on competition, rather than predation.13 0
On January 1, 1985, the CAB relinquished its antitrust
regulatory power to the Department of Transportation.13'
The federal government continued the lenient stance to-
ward antitrust claims.13 2 Alfred Kahn, former director of
the Civil Aeronautics Board under President Carter, stated
that the Department of Transportation treated its enforce-
ment powers as if antitrust law did not exist.' 33 This prac-
tice of relative non-enforcement continues up to the
"2 Berger & Mitchell, supra note 121, at 296.
' Id. at 297.
128 Id.
'- Id. In this case, Airwest was found guilty of predatory pricing when it at-
tempted to push a small, up-start airline, Cochise, out of one of its only two markets.
Id. The CAB seemed to focus on the fact that this market was vital to Cochise's
existence and that Airwest was recouping its losses on its price scheme by raising
prices on its more profitable routes. Id.; see Hughes Airwest, Competitive Fares 74
C.A.B. 926 (1977).
130 See Moore, supra note 118, at 2666. The Civil Aeronautics Board's compla-
cency may have been due to what Moore refers to as the Reagan and Bush adminis-
trations' "distaste for regulation and preference for free-market economics." Id.
131 BARLow, supra note 120, at 34. As part of the deregulation of the airline indus-
try, the deregulators wanted to destroy regulation altogether and they saw the CAB
as just another bureaucratic link in the chain of federal regulation. Id. As a result,
they ordered the CAB to be completely liquidated. Id. See Civil Aeronautics Board
Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 99-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 1551 (b)(1) (C) (1988)).
132 See Moore, supra note 118, at 2666.
113 Hobart Rowen, The End of Airline Deregulation , WASH. PosT, June 4, 1993, at
A25.
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present day. 13 4 Professor Paul S. Dempsey, a transportation
law expert, stated that " [t] he regulated oligopoly which ex-
isted under regulation has simply been replaced with un-
regulated oligopoly, free to exert its market power with
impunity." 1 5  Thus, it appears that current practices will
continue indefinitely unless the Clinton Administration al-
ters the regulatory framework of the airline industry.136
III. ANALYSIS OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. V
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
A. OVERVIEW
In Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.137
plaintiffs Continental and Northwest Airlines alleged that
defendant American Airlines engaged in predatory pric-
ing. 138 In support of their allegations, the plaintiffs pointed
to the defendant's "Value Pricing" plan, which they alleged
was an attempt to illegally restrain trade.'39 American's
Value Pricing Plan cut full coach fares by thirty-eight per-
cent and eliminated most discounts. 4 ° A few months after
implementation, American cut advance-purchase ticket
prices by fifty percent.' 4' One view of the net effect of the
plan was that it "filled planes over the summer while it emp-
134 Id.
" Id.
" See infta notes 300-312 and accompanying text.
" 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
3 See generally Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 2, Continental Airlines, Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (No. G-92-CV-266) [here-
inafter Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint].
"' Id. at 12-13.
- Stephen D. Solomon, The Bully of the Skies Cries Uncle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1993,
§ 6, at 37.
141 Id. American stated that it made this additional price cut only in response to
the NorthWest's fare promotion, which allowed an adult and child to travel for the
price of the adult's ticket. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 22.
Plaintiffs stated, however, that American's action went much further than necessary
and American instead "offered ruinous, uneconomic discounts for a far greater
number of passengers and incurred substantially larger revenue losses to itself,
which were avoidable if it had merely matched NorthWest's limited promotional
fares." Id. at 22.
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tied more than one billion dollars from the pockets of the
airline companies."142
In general, the plaintiffs alleged that American was trying
to drive its competitors from the market by pricing below
cost in accordance with its Value Pricing Plan.1 43 The plain-
tiffs alleged that after its competitors were eliminated,
American planned on charging supracompetitive prices to
recoup its losses.1 44
In questioning the legality of this plan, plaintiffs made
several specific allegations. First, plaintiffs alleged that
American had tried to persuade its competitors to charge
higher prices.1 45 As evidence of this allegation, plaintiffs
pointed to the fact that United and Delta had decided to
implement a plan similar to that of American's Value Pric-
ing plan.1 46 Because of the similarity of the pricing plans,
the plaintiffs believed that United and Delta had accepted
American's invitation to invoke predatory prices.1 47
Second, plaintiffs contended that American had re-
strained price competition. 48 Plaintiffs argued that, be-
cause American set its prices so low, it would be able to
deny its competitors the opportunity to compete without
also incurring huge losses.1 49 Ultimately, plaintiffs believed
that American's competitors would be driven from the
market.1 50
Third, plaintiffs argued that American had tried to disci-
pline its competitors that refused to follow its price sig-
nals.5 Plaintiffs believed that by setting its prices so low,
142 Solomon, supra note 140, at 37. The Plaintiffs added that American's revenues
dropped over $500 million in the second and third quarters due to the implementa-
tion of the Value Pricing scheme. See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note
138, at 15. The Plaintiffs noted that American's loss in the third quarter of 1992 was
its first third quarter loss in its history. Id.
143 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 693.
144 Id.
145 Id.
- See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 16.
47 Id. at 20.
- Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 693.
149 See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 13.
'so Id.
1," Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 692.
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American could easily identify those competitors that failed
to implement similar plans and follow its predatory pricing
scheme. 15 2 As the plaintiffs argued, American would then
discipline these disagreeable competitors through the use
of "other anticompetitive tactics." 1 3
In response to these allegations, defendant American Air-
lines presented its own arguments. 154 American pointed
out that predatory pricing is very rare and that "predatory
pricing claims should be viewed with suspicion."155 In addi-
tion, American claimed that the plaintiffs' claims of preda-
tory pricing caused much harm to free enterprise by
discouraging price competition. 15 6
With that in mind, American then stated that their con-
duct was not really predatory, but competitive in nature. 1 5
American asserted that its Value Pricing Plan was merely an
attempt to "simplify consumer choices" and that their deci-
sion to implement the plan resulted only from their at-
tempt to stay afloat in an extremely competitive, difficult
industry.1 5s Because of the high level of competitiveness,
152 Id. at 693.
155 Id. The plaintiffs failed to state in their pleadings what they meant by "other
anticompetitive tactics." Id.
5 See generally American's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 19.
155 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 697. The court agreed with Ameri-
can's defense with supporting language from Matsushita. Id. Specifically, the court
restated the often-quoted phrase that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful." Id.; see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589. American
added that NorthWest, in defense to a similar predatory pricing suit, asserted that
predatory pricing infrequently occurs and even stated that "it just can't happen" in
the airline industry. American's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 19, at 3.
- American's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 19, at 2. American
warned that the Plaintiffs' case would chill "aggressive price competition and the low
prices that result" from such competition. Id.
157 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 703.
- Id. at 693. The court supported American's view of the competitive nature of
the airline industry when it stated that "[ciriticism [of the airline industry] led to
deregulation by 1980 of pricing and entry on domestic routes, and the industry saw
intense rivalry along with bankruptcy of poorly managed airlines." Id. at 697 n.13
(quoting PAUL A. SAMUALSON & WILLIAM P. NoRDHAus, ECONOMICS 75 (14th ed.
1992)). Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that Value Pricing was designed
"to put weak carriers out of business and redistribute their shares to [American]
and, perhaps, other strong carriers." See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note
138, at 18. But an earlier comment by NorthWest's Chief Executive Officer seems to
completely contradict NorthWest's statements in the Amended Complaint. See Amer-
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American believed that "any attempt to engage in predatory
pricing [was] doomed from the outset."159 Thus, American
argued that business necessity, not predatory intent, drove
its decision to implement the pricing scheme. 60
In addition, American argued that plaintiffs' claim of
predatory pricing was "utterly baseless."16" ' In particular,
American pointed to the fact that no economically rational
reason existed to implement a predatory pricing scheme.'62
To support this statement, American claimed that it would
not be able to recover its losses and make a profit because it
could not maintain supracompetitive prices for a long
enough period of time. 63 Thus, American contended that
no incentive existed to implement a predatory pricing
scheme because it would only result in huge losses with no
hope of recoupment. 164
Finally, American argued that it had no intent to con-
spire with competitors Delta and United.1 65  American
ican Revamps Air Fares; Others Follow Suit, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, April 1, 1992, at
IA, 15A. Specifically, the Northwest CEO stated that American's "new fare structure
will be simpler, fairer and more understandable for our customers and will allow
them to fly for less." Id.
15 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 703. The court again agreed with de-
fendant when the court stated that American's "contention [was] supported by
[p]laintiffs' allegations that [d]efendants [had] unsuccessfully tried for over ten
years to raise prices above competitive levels." Id.
160 American's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 19, at 9. American Air-
lines' counsel, Robert Cooper, stated that American was just acting with business
acumen and that it was simply matching its competitors' prices. Parloff, supra note
79, at 63. In his opening statement, Cooper stated that "[w]hen [American]
matched [prices], that can't be predatory." Id.
161 McKenna, supra note 4, at 34. American also claimed that the plaintiffs were
using their bankruptcy status to seek "special advantages of different kinds" to aid
them in a struggling industry. Id. American criticized Continental's use of the fed-
eral bankruptcy laws to "lower its costs and protect itself from competition" and
criticized NorthWest as a company that "pil[ed] debt after debt after debt on what
was one of the most consistently profitable airline companies." Id.
162 American's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 19, at 3. American
stated that the Plaintiffs' claims rested "on the inherently implausible notion that a
rational business enterprise will deliberately lose huge sums of money on a specula-
tive hope that it thereby will succeed in destroying all of its competitors and then will
be able to recoup its losses quickly." Id. at 2-3.
1 6 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 703.
164 American's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 19, at 3.
165 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 703.
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stated that even if it had conspired with United and Delta, it
would not have been able to recoup its losses.1 66 American
theorized that if United, Delta, and American had suc-
ceeded in driving all other competitors from the market be-
cause of a predatory pricing scheme, the remaining
competitors would have a strong incentive to cheat.1 67 This
cheating would prevent any of the competitors from re-
couping its losses and would result in yet another level of
pricing schemes. 168 Thus, American based its final argu-
ment again on economic theory and argued that the irra-
tionality of implementing a predatory pricing scheme
negated the inference that American had acted with preda-
tory, rather than competitive, intent.1 69
B. THE COURT HELD IN FAVOR OF AMERICAN AIRLINES
Before the jury went into deliberations, the judge in-
structed the jury that they had to be certain that American
had tried to control the airline industry through predatory
pricing.1 70 After less than two hours of deliberation, the
jury reached a verdict in favor of the defendant, American
Airlines. 171 The jury found that American's predatory pric-
ing scheme, as alleged by plaintiffs, would be "extraordina-
rily expensive and have no realistic chance of success."17 2
Although a Continental spokesperson stated that plaintiffs
were confident about their chances of a successful ap-
16- American's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 19, at 6-7.
167 Continental Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. at 703.
16, American's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 19, at 33.
169 Id.
170 Wada, supra note 72, at 1.
171 Id. After U.S. DistrictJudge Samuel Kent lifted the gag order on jurors, one of
the 12 jurors stated that she still believed that American was guilty of predatory
pricing. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Lone Juror Believed American Airlines Guilty, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 1993, at 2D. She said she cast her vote after she decided
that none of the other 11 jurors would even consider American guilty and that an
attempt at persuasion would be totally useless. Id. She stated, "[i] t would have been
over within 15 minutes if I hadn't dragged my feet." Id.
172 Predatory Pricing Idea Unrealistic, supra note 5, at 5c.
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peal, 173 both Continental and NorthWest decided not to ap-
peal the district court's decision. 74
II. EFFECTS OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. V
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
A. NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON PARTIES TO A PREDATORY
PRICING SUIT
The size and complexity of a predatory pricing suit nega-
tively affects the parties to the suit in several ways. First, the
costs to the parties of bringing or defending against a pred-
atory pricing claim can be staggering. 175  It is no surprise
that predatory pricing cases have been extraordinarily
costly to litigate.' 7 For example, American spent at least
$20 million defending against the plaintiffs' claims. 77 Rob-
ert Crandall, American's CEO, stated that this $20 million
did not include the fees of any of the defense attorneys or
the time of the senior executives who devoted long hours to
the defense. 178 Judging from Crandall's statements, not
only do such suits deplete the economic resources of the
companies involved, such suits also adversely affect the per-
sonnel of the companies. 79  As one editorial stated,
"[t] here's something seriously awry when financially ailing
7 Wada, supra note 72, at 1.
174 Briefing, DALLAS MORNtNG NEws, Sept. 17, 1993, at 10D. Continental and
Northwest weighed the cost of pursuing an appeal with the extreme difficulty of
winning on appeal due to the stringent legal standards. Id. Judging from their deci-
sions, it appears that Continental and Northwest concluded that the large cost bur-
den greatly outweighed the minimal opportunity for a favorable outcome. Id.
175 Easterbrook, supra note 81, at 336.
176 Id. at 334. Easterbrook arrived at this conclusion after reviewing the annual
defense costs of AT&T; the company reported that it spent an estimated $100 mil-
lion defending against claims of predation. Id.
177 McKenna, supra note 4, at 34.
178 Id. Crandall failed to state what this $20 million did include. Id. Crandall
noted that American's senior marketing executive spent several weeks prior to trial
and the weeks during trial in Galveston, preparing for the defense. Id. Thus, the
total cost to American seems to be almost incalculable, considering the senior exec-
utives' foregone opportunity costs. Id.
179 Id.
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companies throw away millions battling over dubious
charges.""'°
The concern over the company's well-being sheds light
on the second negative effect of a predatory pricing suit:
such claims distract attention away from the everyday opera-
tion of the business.' 8' The parties involved would have
been much better off if the $20-30 million spent in the case
had been used to help the ailing airline industry, instead of
going toward payment of legal fees.182 Robert Crandall
complained that the large monetary and time resource ex-
penses of defending against the suit "threatened the very
existence of the company." 8 3 Crandall seemed pleased,
however, that after the jury verdict American executives
could return their full attention to the company, which lost
$1.4 billion between October 1990 and March 1993.184
With such large losses, any further prolonged distraction
could cripple the parties involved, as well as the industry as
a whole.'8 5 American was not the only party to the suit that
could not afford the legal distractions; Continental and
Northwest are both in bankruptcy.8 6 Surely, such a costly
distraction only hindered the two plaintiffs' attempts to re-
organize and regain profitability.
B. EFFEcTs ON MAJOR AIRLINES
In addition to affecting the parties involved, the case
greatly affected other major airlines as well. The greatest
effect may be that parties will be more reluctant to bring
such suits in the future. 8 7 While Continental and North-
West seemed overtly confident about their chances of a suc-
180 Air Fares: Poor Case, Good Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, § 4, at 14.
181 McKenna, supra note 4, at 34.
182 LegalFeud: Courts Aren't the Answer to Airline Woes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.
15, 1993, at 2J.
18W McKenna, supra note 4, at 34.
184 Zimmerman & Maxon, supra note 6, at ID. Incidentally, American showed a
$47 million profit for the second quarter of 1993. Id.
185 Id.
186 McKenna, supra note 4, at 34.
187 Telephone Interview with Andy Steinberg, Counsel for American Airlines
(Nov. 3, 1993) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Steinberg Interview].
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cessful appeal, they nevertheless chose not to appeal the
district court's decision.' Because potential claimants of
predatory pricing violations may have observed the over-
whelming costs to the parties involved and the extremely
high burden of proof required, such future claimants may
reconsider their decision to file such a claim. 189 As a result,
this case may serve to decrease the number of predatory
pricing suits filed not only within the airline industry but
within other industries well.190
In addition to warning potential claimants of predatory
pricing of the negative aspects of such a suit, the case may
have also affected the major airlines' views of how they will
price their flights in the future. Disagreement exists upon
the net effect of this case on airline pricing strategies.
Some analysts believe that the case will encourage airlines
to become more aggressive with their pricing policies. 91
Others believe that the case will have no effect and that air-
lines' pricing strategies will remain the same after the suit
as they were before the verdict.192 Some analysts believe
that the case will actually encourage airlines to cut prices
and will initiate new fare wars.' 93 Julius Maldutis, an analyst
with Salomon Brothers Inc., stated that the "lawsuit had a
chilling effect and essentially delayed any major fare pro-
motions," but projected that airlines would now pursue
pricing initiatives as they seem to be relatively free of legal
sanctions.1 94 Maldutis also projected that fare reductions
and wars would begin as soon as one week after the jury
rendered its verdict. 95 Because of the airlines' seeming ju-
dicial immunity, some analysts believe that airlines may be
even more likely to initiate price wars after the verdict.196
188 Briefing, supra note 174, at 10D.
189 Steinberg Interview, supra note 187.
190 Id.




199 Zimmerman & Maxon, supra note 6, at ID.
'9 Id.; see also Valujet Charges Delta with Predatory Pricing, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 23,
1993, at 460. As an example of an airline that aggressively priced its flights after the
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In contrast, others believe that the case will not affect the
airline pricing strategies and that major airlines will con-
tinue with business just as they did before the initiation of
the suit.197 Robert Crandall may have summarized this view
most effectively when he stated that the "lawsuit has not had
an impact on the willingness of people to reduce fares. It
has not inhibited our willingness to set our fares where we
thought they should be."19' Some analysts believe that air-
lines price their flights in response to supply and demand,
rather than the threat of litigation; as long as there is an
over-supply of aircraft and an under-supply of consumer de-
mand, airlines will price aggressively.' 99 Crandall added
that "[i]n a very competitive industry, [American Airlines]
must match the lowest price established by rivals."2 °0 As an
example of the airlines' relative disregard for the outcome
of the case, Delta went so far as to launch a fare war a week
before the jury rendered its verdict.20 1 Thus, it appears that
airlines will continue to aggressively price their flights even
though competitors may accuse them of predatory
pricing.20 2
verdict, Delta was accused of predatory behavior by Valujet just four months after
the verdict. Id. ValuJet accused Delta of "capacity dumping" as Delta discounted
12,000 seats, which was equivalent to more than three times the number of seats
offered by Valujet altogether. Id. Although Transportation Secretary Pefia met with
Valujet officials to discuss their accusations, no formal Department of Transporta-
tion or Justice Department investigation has been initiated. Id.
197 Zimmerman & Maxon, supra note 6, at ID.
'9 Id.
199 Id.
- Wada, supra note 72, at 1. Ironically, Crandall also stated that American "prob-
ably won't be attempting that type of leadership again." Id. So while Crandall seems
to downplay the effects of the case, he also agrees that American will not pursue the
same course of action after the suit as it did before it. Id.
201 Zimmerman & Maxon, supra note 6, at ID.
-02 Id. Wide agreement exists as to the hypothetical effects on airlines' pricing
strategies if the jury had rendered its verdict for the plaintiffs instead. Id. Such a
verdict would have convinced the airlines to make much more conservative deci-
sions. Id. An analyst with Avmark Inc. stated that "[i]f you start lowering fares, you
have to think whether you're going to be accused by someone of predatory pricing."
Id. Thus, airlines would be much less likely to price aggressively if the verdict had
gone the other way. Id.
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C. EFFECTS ON SMALLER AIRLINES
In addition to affecting the major airlines, the outcome
of the Continental versus American case and predation in
general greatly affected small airlines. 03 Because of their
relatively small size and minor share of the market, small
airlines lack the leverage necessary to compete with many
of their larger rivals.204
Although a small airline was not a party to the suit involv-
ing Continental and American, small airlines may feel the
effects of the suit nevertheless. 20 5 The outcome of the suit
may actually encourage the large airlines to match the
prices of their smaller rivals, even if such a price cut
reduces their prices below average variable cost.20 6 Prior to
the suit, the larger airlines may have felt some apprehen-
sion in cutting their prices to such a low level. 2 7 Now,
larger airlines may feel more comfortable with making ag-
gressive pricing decisions because they may feel as if they
are free from legal constraints.208
The outcome of the suit may affect the tendency of
smaller airlines to file predatory pricing suits against their
larger rivals. 0 9 Small airlines may wonder how they can
bring a predatory pricing claim if a large airline with the
financial resources of Continental cannot successfully bring
such a claim.210 As a result, the suit may deter smaller air-
- James Ott, UltrAir Suspends Service, Reviews Charter Option, AViATiON WV & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 2, 1993, at 34.
-o See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 42. Plaintiffs noted that
AMR's market dominance enhanced the already substantial barriers to entry into
the market. Id. Plaintiffs listed several specific barriers, which included frequent
flyer programs, noise regulation, and investment capital. Id. Although they listed
several barriers, Plaintiffs failed to connect the barriers with any wrongdoing on the
part of American.
20- Steinberg Interview, supra note 187.
Id. Large airlines may be willing to take such an economic hit if they foresee
the possibility of driving their smaller competitors from the market.
20 Id.
2W Id.
2-2 Steinberg Interview, supra note 187. See also Edward L. McKenna, American Air-
lines Pricing Verdict May Auger New Round of Fare Wars, INSIDE DOT & TRsp. WE.,
Aug. 13, 1993, at 32.
210 Steinberg Interview, supra note 187. Patrick Murphy, president and CEO of
AvSOLUTIONS, an aviation-consulting firm, projected that the verdict will make
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lines from resorting to legal action when a larger airline
matches their prices in the future.211
In addition to the. possible deterrent effect on future
suits, predation in general greatly affects the smaller carri-
ers in other ways. Predation often prevents small "up-start"
airlines from even entering the market.212 Because the air-
line industry requires such a large initial capital outlay,
many prospective airlines cannot recover costs as prices are
driven down by their larger competitors .2 1  Because of the
larger airlines' economies of scale, many prospective small
carriers feel the effects of predation even before they make
the decision to enter the market.214
After entering the market, small airlines then experience
even greater effects of predation. Small airlines cannot af-
ford to stay in business unless their flights are full and, with
predatory pricing, many of their flights are less than full. 21 5
As a result, many small carriers are pushed out of business
because they can no longer compete.2 16 For example, Ul-
trAir, a start-up airline based in Houston with just 200 em-
ployees, 217  stopped flying after just six months of
future predatory pricing claims more difficult to bring. McKenna, supra note 209, at
32.
211 Steinberg Interview, supra note 187.
212 Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, supra note 109, at 1063. Although Kahn states
that predation blocks entry for many up-starts, Kahn also admits that the difficulty of
entering the market as an up-start may be due to the success of the incumbent carri-
ers at reducing their own costs. Id.
215 See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 42. Plaintiffs stated that
barriers to entry within the airline industry are "substantial" and include "significant
economies of scale and scope." Id. Plaintiffs also named the following as barriers to
entry: frequent flyer promotions; "limits on access to gate facilities and take off and
landing rights" at major airports; "the limited availability of investment capital for
entry" into the airline industry; and "predatory conduct" by American Airlines. Id.
214 Id,
215 Kahn, Thinking about Predation-A Personal Diary, supra note 109, at 141 n.6.
216 Id.
217 Jane Baird, Staying Airborne. Despite Industry Slump, Many Think Start-up Carriers
Have Good Chance, HousToN CHRON., May 23, 1993, at BI. While the author por-
trayed the outlook for up-starts as bright, she nevertheless quoted an analyst who
stated that "[m]ost entrants will fail, as they do in any industry, let alone the savagely
competitive airline industry." Id.
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business. 218  Barney Kogen, co-founder of UltrAir, blamed
the company's demise on predatory pricing efforts by com-
petitor Continental Airlines. 219  Even if small airlines are
fortunate enough to overcome the high entry barriers in
the airline industry, they may be driven out of business by
their larger, predatory competitors.2 °
D. EFFECTS ON CONSUMERS
The Continental versus American case and predatory
pricing in general have also affected consumers to the ex-
tent that airlines withheld favorable pricing actions from
the consumer during the trial.22' Specifically, the plaintiffs,
Continental and NorthWest Airlines, withheld pricing ac-
tions while the suit was pending.222 Thus, consumers may
be deprived of price discounts and promotions from the
time predatory pricing actions are filed until parties no
longer wish to pursue the matter. 23 As a result, consumers
will be forced to pay higher prices. 24
218 Isae Wada, UltrAir Cancels Scheduled Trips, Seeks to Remain as Charter Line, TRAVEL
WKLY., July 29, 1993, at 1.
219 Ott, supra note 203, at 34. In response to these accusations, a Continental
spokesperson said, "Continental's fare actions in this competitive environment were
totally lawful. To imply that our actions were illegal and taken for any other reason
is ludicrous and clearly without merit." Id. In addition, the spokesperson stated that
UltrAir's predatory pricing claims against Continental could not be compared to
Continental's claims against American. Id. The spokesperson did not state the basis
for this inability to compare the two sets of claims. Id. Incidentally, UltrAir dropped
its charges against Continental after Department of Transportation officials were
unable to procure any evidence to substantiate the charge. Id.
2 But see Baird, supra note 217. In her article, Baird presented an optimistic
outlook for small airlines' chances for success in spite of their larger rivals. As an
example, Baird pointed out that Southwest Airlines "is considered the one airline to
have successfully taken advantage of deregulation to grow into a major airline." Id.
But Baird's optimism is contradicted by her own statement that Southwest is the one
successful upstart. Id. [emphasis added].
22 Steinberg Interview, supra note 187.
Ia d. At the time of the interview, approximately three months after the verdict,
Northwest offered tickets at a discount of 40% off the face-value of the ticket. Id.
Presumably, the consumer would have been able to take advantage of the 40% dis-
count while the suit had been going on as if the suit had never been filed. Id.
- Id. This may be caused in part by the fact that any pricing actions taken during
this time may be scrutinized to a greater extent because of the presumption that
such actions may be predatory. Id.
224 Steinberg Interview, supra note 187.
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The consumer will also be directly affected by the suit
because society will have to absorb the cost of the expen-
sive, time-consuming litigation. 22 5 The parties to the suit
will have to charge higher airfare to pay for the resource-
draining litigation, 26 thus passing the cost on to society as a
whole because air travelers are from all segments of the
economy. Second, society will have to bear the- costs of ap-
prehending and prosecuting the supposed violator.2 27 This
particular suit lasted for over one year and required many
hours of judicial resources.228
Consumers are not just affected while predatory pricing
claims are being pursued. Rather, they are also continu-
ously affected in several ways by predatory pricing in gen-
eral. In the short run, predatory, aggressive pricing actions
by airlines are a boon for consumers,229 who have many bar-
gains from which to choose.2 30 Because predatory pricing
necessarily involves cutting prices below a certain level, air-
lines that price aggressively push their prices down in an
attempt to drive their competitors out of business. 3' In re-
sponse, competitors also lower their prices out of business
necessity to match the predator's prices. 32 As a result, con-
sumers are able to choose between different airlines that
have practically the same low prices due to the fare war.2 3
Thus, predation saves the consumer money by reducing
airfares in the short term.23 4
While the consumer benefits from predation in the short
run, the consumer pays for those benefits in the long
223 Easterbrook, supra note 81, at 320.
r" Id.
227 Id.
- McKenna, supra note 4, at 34.
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2588, reh'g denied, 114 S. Ct. 13 (1993).
2Courts Aren't the Answer to Airline Woes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 15, 1993, at2j.
*31 See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 138, at 2.
232 Id.
233 See Carole A. Shifrin, IATA Projects Smaller 1993 Losses, AVIATION WE. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 23, 1993, at 33. One recent study found that airfares have dropped 68%
over the past 20 years. Id.
234 Brooke Group Ltd., 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
902
PREDATORY PRICING THEORY
run.23 5 Pierre Jeanniot, director-general of the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association, stated that his "main con-
cern about price wars is that they are sending a wrong
message to travelers-that air fares can continue to, go
down indefinitely."2 36 Unfortunately for the consumer,
fares cannot continue to decrease while airlines move
closer to bankruptcy by losing billions of dollars annually.
2 37
To recoup their losses and to run more efficiently, airlines
will be forced to raise prices in the future.2 38 As a result,
the predatory and aggressive behavior of airlines, which
seemed attractive to the consumer in the short run, will un-
doubtedly catch-up to consumers in the long run through
higher prices.23 9
III. ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS TO
THE PRESENT SITUATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Judging from their effects on airlines and consumers, cer-
tain airline pricing actions, whether they are termed preda-
tory or simply aggressive, can be relatively damaging to
those groups.24 ° The laissez-faire attitude toward airlines'
pricing actions imposes huge costs on the airlines as well as
the consumer. If these pricing actions place so much hard-
ship on the airlines and consumers, the question then be-
comes what should be done about the present situation to
help alleviate some of these negative effects? The answer to
this question ranges from maintaining the airline industry's
current deregulated state to the other extreme of a return
to intense government involvement and regulation.
To properly analyze this question and to arrive at an ap-
propriate solution, it is necessary to recognize, appreciate,
235 Shifrin, supra note 233, at 33.
2- Id. Jeanniot attributed his concern to the fact that he saw no major productiv-




2 4 See supra notes 175-240 and accompanying text.
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and understand the competing interests involved. The first
interest is that of the major airlines, which push for little
regulation of pricing actions and encourage measures that
stimulate competition. Smaller airlines, on the other hand,
call for the imposition of greater restraints on their larger
rivals. At the same time, however, these smaller airlines
want to avoid pervasive regulation that could hinder their
own pricing actions. The third group, consumers, seems to
have dual, competing interests as well. On one hand, con-
sumers favor little regulation of the airline industry because
they want inexpensive flights. Yet on the other hand, con-
sumers also want some type of airline regulation to pro-
mote the safety and efficiency of the industry. The fourth
and final group, the government, has the most difficult
choice of all four groups as it must juggle the competing
regulatory and deregulatory interests of large airlines, small
airlines, and consumers.
Because of these four sets of competing interests, the an-
swer to the question of what should be done to remedy the
present situation regarding pricing is very difficult. No
clear solution exists, and the interests or one of more
groups may be impaired by the final outcome. But a deci-
sion must be made soon as airlines continue to attempt, le-
gally or illegally, to drive competitors out of business and,
in so doing, escalate costs to the consumer. To arrive at a
possible solution to the present situation, it is necessary to
analyze alternatives.
B. MAINTAIN CURRENT DEREGULATED STATUS OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The first alternative is not really an alternative at all. It is
simply an argument to maintain the status quo of deregula-
tion and to do nothing to remedy the present situation. 4'
Strongly supporting this alternative is the fact that the fine
line between competition and predation is often too diffi-
2141 See generally Scherer, supra note 60.
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cult to draw. 42 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals may
have summarized this belief most effectively when it stated:
The difficulty, of course, is distinguishing highly competi-
tive pricing from predatory pricing. A firm that cuts its
prices or substantially reduces its profit margin is not neces-
sarily engaging in predatory pricing. It may simply be re-
sponding to new competition, or to a downturn in market
demand. Indeed, there is a real danger in mislabeling such
practices as predatory, because consumers generally benefit
from the low prices resulting from aggressive price
competition.243
Because of the fear of "mislabeling" healthy competition as
predatory, the present situation may be best left as it is.
2 14
Following the Eighth Circuit's view, if any action is taken
to alter the present situation, such action may have a delete-
rious effect on competition.245 The Supreme Court noted
that "[w]e must be concerned [with] a rule or precedent
that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable
pricing behavior [that] end[s] up by discouraging legiti-
mate price competition."246 By discouraging price competi-
tion, courts feel that an attempt to change the present
situation would "render illegal any decision by a firm to cut
prices in order to increase market share."247 Thus, airlines
may be fearful of cutting prices and the consumer may be
hurt since consumers benefit from healthy price competi-
tion.2 4' Because airlines and consumers may be injured by
altering present attitudes toward pricing decisions, the sys-
tem may be best left as it is, as any attempt to alter the situa-
tion may only discourage and possibly even stifle healthy
price competition.249
242 Id.
243 Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (8th Cir. 1989).
244 See generally Scherer, supra note 60.
245 Id.
246 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986).
247 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2588 (1993) (citing Caugill, Inc. v. Montford of Colorado, Inc., 476 U.S. 104, 116
(1986)).
-8 See generally Scherer, supra note 60.
249 Id.
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C. INCREASE REGULATION OF AIRLINE PRICING ACTIONS
The second alternative to the present situation advocates
greater regulation of the airline industry's pricing poli-
cies. 250 Because deregulation may be seen as actually hav-
ing damaged competition, a return to some form of
regulation may be likely.2 1  One way to increase airline
pricing regulation would be to increase judicial and legal
regulation of the airline industry by lowering the difficult
predatory pricing standard to allow for more successful
claims of predatory pricing.2 52 In other words, a predatory
pricing claimant's burden of proof would be lowered, al-
lowing the plaintiff to bring such a claim more easily.25
Although this alternative may be facially simple to imple-
ment, hidden costs may result. First, if major airlines were
forced to maintain higher prices due to increased regula-
tion, the public would pay the cost differential. 54 Second,
increased regulation of aggressive airlines would encourage
inefficient airlines to enter or remain in the market.2 55 Be-
cause of these costs to the competitive marketplace, ques-
'5 Cudahy, supra note 109, at 15; Richard D. Cudahy, Regulation/Competition: The
Swing of the Pendulum, PuB. UTIL. FORT., April 1, 1991, at 24.
251 Cudahy, supra note 109, at 15. Cudahy stated that the government interven-
tion will be termed something other than "regulation," to avoid the negative conno-
tation of the word Id. at 13 n.51. Although many commentators feel that regulation
is necessary, they fail to suggest areas or types of regulation needed. Id. Judge
Cudahy admitted that he would not try to define the type or scope of regulation
necessary to help the airline industry. Id. at 14. Cudahy specified only that the
regulation should not be all-encompassing or overly protective, but rather common-
sensical. Id. at 15.
252 See Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatoy Pric-
ing Policy, 89 YAu L.J. 213, 216 (1979).
253 &d Joskow and Klevorick worried that lowering the standard would test the
"institutional competence" of courts attempting to apply a lower standard. Id. Spe-
cifically, Joskow and Klevorick were concerned with what "courts can do well, what
kind of information they can possess, and what issues are 'too speculative' for judges
or juries to decide." Id. In addition, Joskow and Klevorick raised questions about.
the "capability of administrative agencies," such as the Department of Transporta-
tion, to cope with a lower standard. Id.
25 Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 252, at 223.
2- Id. Joskow and Klevorick noted that this alternative would increase "the cost of
production of the product above the efficient level and (would result] in a waste of
scarce resources and hence in a loss of social welfare." Id.
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tions arise as to the rationale and viability of this
alternative. 56
D. ELIMINATE THE CAUSE OF AcTION FOR PREDATORY
PRICING ALTOGETHER
The third alternative to the present situation calls for the
elimination of the predatory pricing cause of action alto-
gether.57 This alternative is based on the belief that preda-
tory pricing does not exist in the marketplace.2 58  A
predatory pricing cause of action may be considered foolish
because it may be unlikely for a major airline to sacrifice
revenue just to hurt a smaller competitor. 59 Instead, the
aggressive airline is more likely acting competitively rather
than in a predatory manner.26  As a result, it may be unwise
to "construct rules about a phenomenon that probably does
not exist or which, should it exist in very rare cases, the
courts would have grave difficulty distinguishing from com-
petitive price behavior. "261
Despite these concerns, valid reasons exist to maintain
such a cause of action. Although some behavior may be
256 Joskow and Klevorick stated that this alternative may be appealing if it "leads a
sufficient number of firms to enter or to mature so that monopoly pricing is elimi-
nated more quickly than it would have been otherwise." Id. at 223-24.
27 See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA, PREDATORY PRICING 899 (1988); BoRx, supra note 10,
at 144; POSNER, supra note 60, at 189; see also A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre
Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook,J.), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1019 (1990).
m See BoRK, supra note 10, at 144. Bork stated that many people view "firms in
the market as if they were thugs in a dark alley; evidently a large firm has more
muscle and can beat smaller firms to death." Id. Bork believes that such views "do
not reflect theory but are only foolishly inapposite metaphors that ignore the con-
straints the market places upon firm behavior." Id.
259 See id.
2w Id.
"I McGee, supra note 87, at 317 (summarizing Robert H. Bork's views on preda-
tory pricing). McGee acknowledged, however, that the likelihood of abolishing the
cause of action for predatory pricing is unlikely because:
[I]ike it or not, we have and are likely to continue to have some kind
of legal 'rules' to punish predation. Firms will continue to fear and
actually to be beset by costly complaints that they are predators. As a
practical matter, I am afraid that the best we can do is to resist the
worst rules and work to achieve as good rules as we can.
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mistakenly considered predatory, some actual predatory
pricing may occur in the marketplace, and legal recourse
against predatory firms may be necessary to protect compet-
itors and consumers alike.2 62 For example, Alfred Kahn,
former director of the Civil Aeronautics Board under Presi-
dent Carter, stated that predatory pricing does exist and
that major airlines may act rationally by choosing to forgo
profits, hoping to reap future gains.2 63 Kahn thinks that a
predatory pricing strategy would be a "worthwhile price to
pay for snuffing out the upstarts" and restricting competi-
tors.264 Because of his belief that predatory pricing may be
an option for a firm, Kahn feels that a cause of action for
predatory pricing is required to protect competitors and
consumers from actions that may be seen as rational.2 65
Because of the concern over the need to protect consum-
ers and competitors, rules regulating this type of behavior
are likely to persist.2 66 "From the beginning, antitrust [law]
has been concerned with predation .... "267 Because of this
concern, the contemporary marketplace is "unlikely to have
no rule at all" to guard against predatory pricing.2 68
E. REQUIRE COMPETITIVELY RESPONSIVE FARES TO REMAIN
IN EFFECT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME
A fourth alternative would involve placing greater restric-
tions on prices set by aggressive airlines. 69 Specifically, ag-
gressive airlines could be required to maintain their low
fares for a certain amount of time. While director of the








269 See id.; William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Pre-
vention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE LJ. 1 (1979); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 252,
at 255.




Civil Aeronautics Board, Kahn suggested such a proposal
and asked that airlines be required to maintain aggressive
fares for three to five years.2 7 1 By requiring airlines to main-
tain prices over a specified period of time, aggressive air-
lines may reconsider their pricing decisions after thinking
about the long-term effects of their decision.2 72
Although this appears to be a viable alternative, some
questions arise as to its validity. Which prices would need
to be maintained? How long would the prices need to be
maintained? Most importantly, price reductions are a nor-
mal, promotional business activity and any discouragement
of such behavior may be very damaging to the competitive
marketplace.2 73
Due to these concerns, a modified version of this alterna-
tive may be more realistic. For example, a cost-cutting air-
line could be required to maintain its low prices for six
months to one year, as opposed to the three to five years
suggested by Kahn. By doing so, major airlines may be en-
couraged to cut only those prices they intend to maintain.
F. REGULATE AIRLINES' PUBLISHING OF RATES
As another alternative to the present situation, airlines
could be encouraged through regulation to change the
ways they promote their cheap fares. Currently, all air fare
changes are entered into a database that serves all air-
lines.2 74 After the change is entered into the database, the
27! Cudahy, supra note 109, at 6. Although his proposal was never implemented,
this view is still supported by some commentators today. See e.g.,Joskow & Klevorick,
supra note 252, at 255. Incidentally, Joskow and Klevorick proposed a period of two
years. Id.
272 Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 252, at 255. Joskow and Klevorick explained
that this alternative would help "to ensure that dominant firm price reductions sub-
sequent to a rival's entry are competitive actions and thus sustainable, rather than
predatory moves principally aimed at cementing monopoly power." Id.
272 See Spectrum Sports, Inc., v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890 (1993) (stating
that antitrust regulation of a firm's pricing activities will "dampen the competitive
zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur").
274 Tom Incantalupo, Airlines in Price-Fixing Fight: Antitrust Suit Follows Probe by U.S.
on Fares, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1990, § B, at 45. This database, operated by Airline Tariff
Publishing of Washington, receives thousands of fare changes daily. Id.
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information is then transferred to travel agents and airline
reservation agents via computer reservation systems. 27 5
Before rate changes are permanently entered into the
database, airlines typically publish only advance notice of
fare increases, not fare decreases. 6 By publicizing their
changes this way, airlines are able to test their competitors'
reactions to fare increases.277 If an airline's competitors do
not react to its fare hikes, the airline is likely to drop its
increase.278 If, however, the airline's competitors seem to
support the increase, the airline will maintain the increase
in the reservation system.279 In other words, the issue is
"whether the airline industry is practicing so-called 'price
signaling,' which occurs when one carrier announces in ad-
vance that it will raise certain fares on a given date-and
competing carriers match the increase."28 °
Because of the concern over price signaling through the
use of publicity and reservation systems, airlines could be
prohibited from publicizing notice of their fare increases in
advance of actually entering such increases permanently
into the database.28 ' In addition, airlines could be limited
in providing advance notice of when fare decreases will be
terminated.28 2 If this proposal is implemented, airlines
would have to enter their increases into the reservation sys-
tem prior to any publicity of the increase.28 3
Although this alternative may reduce price-signaling, it
may also create several problems. First, it may hurt consum-
ers because travelers will not know when, if at all, a price
275 Id.
276 Martha M. Hamilton, Is a Suit Over Fares Fair to Consumers? Carriers, Travel




279 Id. Competitors show support for a rival's increase if they increase their own
rates to match the rival's increase. Id.
28 David Field, Air Fares Heighten Antitrust Scrutiny, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1989, at
B5.
28, Hamilton, supra note 276, at El.
2 House Aviation Subcommittee Agrees to FAA Reauthorization Bil4 AvixnoN DAILY,
July 30, 1993, at 164.
2s See id.
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increase is to be expected. 84 As a result, a passenger will
have to pay a higher price if the fare increases between the
time the passenger reserves the ticket and when the passen-
ger actually purchases the ticket.28 5 Second, this alternative
presupposes that the airlines are guilty of antitrust viola-
tions.286 In response to an actual proposal of this alterna-
tive, a spokesperson for Delta said that Delta would
continue to publish advance notice of its fare increases as
Delta sees "nothing in our actions which violates any anti-
trust laws."287
G. PERMIT CONSUMERS TO BRING PREDATORY
PRICING SUITS
As another alternative, antitrust laws could be changed to
"abandon reliance on competitors' suits to enforce the rule
against predation."28 8 Instead, the laws could be changed
to allow consumers to bring private causes of action forpredatory pricing.289 Although this alternative differs from
current antitrust laws, its effect would be similar in that the
proposed plaintiffs' damages would be the same damages as
offered to current plaintiffs, monopoly overcharges. 290 By
allowing a consumer to recover similar damages, this alter-
Hamilton, supra note 276, at El.
285 Id. Paul Ruden, senior vice president of the American Society of Travel
Agents, stated that he could not understand how this alternative would help the
consumer. Id. Ruden said that "[t]he consumer will always be rolling the dice on
the question of whether to buy now or later." Id. Elliot Seiden, vice president of
Northwest Airlines, added, "[t]he impact on consumers is going to be the loss of
information that they use every day to make decisions about whether to buy and
when to buy." Id. This alternative may seem to hit less affluent families particularly
hard as such families usually cannot afford to have their money tied up in tickets
purchased months in advance. Id.
- See Hamilton, supra note 276, at El. For example, the early publishing of rate
increases by airlines suggests that the airlines are participating in a price-signaling
scheme by measuring the responses of competitors prior to permanently entering
the rate in the database. Id.
287 Id.
288 Easterbrook, supra note 81, at 331.
2- Id. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook identified the proper consumer to be those
consumers "who buy after predation has succeeded." Id.
-9o Id. In other words, a successful consumer plaintiff would be able to recover
that portion of the price above marginal cost which consumers paid after the
predator had succeeded in monopolizing the market.
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native would "treat the successful predator like any other
unlawful monopolist."291
In addition to providing consumers with a private cause
of action, this alternative has several other benefits. First,
this change may make the predator's recoupment of lost
profits impossible. 92 Second, this alternative may eliminate
many of the superfluous predatory pricing suits being
brought by competitors "whose incentive in litigating is not
simply to obtain damages but also to hinder the operation
of their rivals."293
In spite of the benefits, this alternative also has several
detriments. First, this alternative does not account for the
damage done by failed predation attempts. 2 94 Second it
may not prevent undetectable predatory pricing
schemes.295
IV. CONCLUSION
At a time when the airlines should be focusing on regain-
ing profitability and strengthening their faltering industry,
some airlines also appear to be engaging in anticompetitive
behavior, namely, predatory pricing.296 Although some air-
29, Id. Easterbrook also likened his alternative to current antitrust law in that the
consumer would have to show the common elements of: 1) selling price greater
than marginal cost; and 2) predatory intent on the seller's part. Easterbrook, supra
note 81, at 331.
292 Id. Easterbrook suggested that the frequency of predatory pricing would de-
crease because now there would be two watchdogs, the government and consumers,
to carefully scrutinize any potential predator's actions. Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. For instance, successful consumer plaintiffs must show monopoly
overcharges, which in turn suggest that only predators who succeeded in monopoliz-
ing the market could be charged by a consumer plaintiff; would-be predators who
only priced below marginal cost but who did not succeed in monopolizing the mar-
ket could not be successfully sued by a consumer plaintiff. Easterbrook, supra note
81, at 331-32.
295 Id. Because consumers are not as knowledgeable about sellers' costs and ex-
penses, the average consumer may not be able to detect predatory pricing schemes,
and many such schemes may go unnoticed. Id.
See NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG, COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUS-
TRY, CHANGE, CHALLENGE AND COMPETITION 12 (1993) [hereinafter COMMISSION RE-
PORT]. The Commission Report describes the airlines as "heavily leveraged,
financial weaklings," possibly due to the accumulation of over $35 billion in debt.
Id.
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lines appear to be acting with predatory intent, courts
rarely find actual predatory pricing. Rather than disciplin-
ing an overly aggressive party, predatory pricing suits only
seem to impose extraordinary costs on the parties involved.
In a struggling industry like the airline industry, such legal
costs can be crippling and can often detract from the air-
lines' attempts to operate at peak efficiency, capacity, and
profitability. 97
Despite rare judicial findings of predatory pricing, air-
lines may nonetheless implement varying measures, such as
Value Pricing, which may have some anticompetitive ef-
fects, regardless of whether the behavior is actionable as
predatory pricing or not. These instances of disputably an-
ticompetitive behavior suggest the need to reevaluate the
predatory pricing cause of action by either abolishing the
predatory pricing theory or by allowing questionable con-
duct. Although many potential reformulating solutions ex-
ist, one can only surmise which is the correct or most
effective option. Nevertheless, something must be done to
address this situation as airlines can no longer afford to
fight futile, costly predatory pricing battles in court.29 8
Seemingly not pleased with the status quo, the Clinton
Administration has taken several steps to suggest that it is at
least willing "to enforce antitrust laws and curb predatory
practices by the major carriers."299 First, President Clinton
appointed a "Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive
Airline Industry," whose job was to examine the industry
and prepare a report detailing a plan to ensure the indus-
try's preservation and advancement. 300 After researching
the needs of the industry, the Commission stated that "the
federal government should vigorously enforce prohibitions
27 See Predatory Lawsuits: Airlines Pricing, TRAVEL WKLu., Aug. 26, 1993, at 10. The
author speculated that after discovering the outcome of the American Airlines case,
"airlines will focus anew on knocking each other out with fares that frequently lack
economic sense." Id. The author suggested that such practices will only weaken the
already damaged airline industry. Id.
298 Rowen, supra note 133, at A25.
- Baird, supra note 217, at B1.
-o Rowan, supra note 133, at A25.
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against anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions." °1 In ad-
dition, the Commission stated that the government should
not seek greater regulation of the industry as such regula-
tion would cause the airlines to be "mired in litigation,"
which would deny the airlines "flexibility to permit rapid
response to changing conditions."0 2 Thus, the Commis-
sion seemed to suggest greater antitrust enforcement with-
out greater regulation as an answer to the industry's
anticompetitive problems. 303
In addition to creating the Commission, President Clin-
ton appointed Federico F. Pefia to be Secretary of Trans-
portation.0 4 One author described Pefia as an "activist"
who has already "demonstrated a willingness to make tough
calls on contentious issues. '3 0 5 For example, Pefia actively
discouraged NorthWest Airlines from trying to drive a new
up-start airline, Reno Air, from one of its southwest mar-
kets.3 0 6 As a result of Pefia's involvement, NorthWest re-
treated and Reno Air still flies in this market.307 Thus, Pefia
appears to be willing to take an active stance against anti-
trust violations. 0 8
In addition to appointing Pefia as Transportation Secre-
tary, President Clinton appointed Anne K. Bingaman as As-
5o, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 296, at 14.
W2 Id.
303 Id.
Kirk Victor, Cabinet Scorecard, NAT'LJ., Nov. 6, 1993, at 2642.
305 Id.; see also The DOT's New Attitude: Interview with the Department of Transportation
Secretary Federico Pegia, TRAvrnc MG T., Dec. 1993, at 35. In this interview Pefia stated
that he has "a philosophy that is very different from [his] predecessor's. [He] will
not tolerate clearly anti-competitive behavior or predatory pricing and predatory
conduct.... Under [his] administration, [the DOT has] taken the position that
where appropriate, [the DOT] will assert [its] jurisdiction." Id.
06 Rowen, supra note 133, at A25. In 1991, Northwest pulled out of the Reno
market and did not return until Reno Air commenced operation and began to fly
three daily flights from Reno to NorthWest's Minneapolis hub. In alleged retalia-
tion, Northwest began to fly to Reno and three other West Coast cities, competing
directly with Reno Air. David Knibb, Illegal Activity: A Matter of Trust, AIRLINE Bus.,
June 1993, at 24. Although it does not appear Pefia took any direct enforcement
action, he reportedly "gave Northwest two days to reconsider its plans or face DOT
action." NorthWest Forced to Drop Its Reno Plans, FLiGrr INT'L, Apr. 7, 1993, at 1.
-7 Knibb, supra note 306, at 24.
08 See Victor, supra note 304, at 2642-43.
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sistant Attorney General for Antitrust.3 °  Sources call her
"aggressive" and state that she has already "scared business
with tough talk about vigorous [antitrust law] enforce-
ment."310 Additionally, it appears that the Antitrust Divi-
sion is covertly investigating the airline industry for possible
antitrust abuses, possibly including predatory pricing viola-
tions.311 As a result of these appointments, it appears that
the Clinton Administration is addressing the problem of
predatory pricing through greater enforcement of the anti-
trust laws rather than through greater regulation.
The Clinton Administration's choice to pursue greater
enforcement of the antitrust laws may or may not solve the
problems within the airline industry due to predatory pric-
ing and other anticompetitive behavior. The point is that
the Administration appears to be concerned with this prob-
lem and appears to recognize the importance of its resolu-
tion. In contrast, over the past decade a policy of leniency
and lack of enforcement has been pervasive and has re-
sulted in much destructive competition. Whether the Clin-
ton Administration's choice is the correct one remains to
be seen, but the truth of the matter is that it is a step in the
right direction.. Whichever path the government and
courts select to address this problem, a decision must be
made immediately as airlines can no longer afford to bring
or defend against futile claims of predatory pricing while
pursuing profitability and attempting to restore the health
of their beleaguered industry.
- Moore, supra note 118, at 2666.
310 Id.
311 See id. One antitrust attorney stated that "antitrust, which was sluggish if not
dead in the mid-1980's, is now extremely active. .. ." Id. Another attorney stated
that "[iut's fair to say that we have now completed a swing of the pendulum," as
antitrust attorneys saw their business decrease during the Reagan and Bush Adminis-
trations. Id.
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